HISTORY - Page 33

Air Force-Army Employment Concept Differences The Army recognized that a large degree of the planned mobility for the system would be lost, for the Air Force method was, by and large, to operate from fixed installations. In this respect, the Air Force planned to gain an initial operational capability (IOC) with the IRBM's against enemy airfields and thereby enhance the penetration ability of manned bombers to win the airpower battle. As the battle progressed, the IRBM's would be launched against secondary targets within range, accuracy, and warhead yield limitations. In other words, the missiles would serve as adjuncts to Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases, and the launching sites would be satellited around these installations. As might be suspected, swift reaction within a 15-minute period was a must because these static-type launching sites would certainly be located by enemy reconnaissance. This meant that servicing, orientation, and checkout of the missile prior to launching would have to be accomplished rapidly. The element of success depended on hitting the enemy sites first. To the Army, this thinking was a calculated risk. World War II V-l and V-2 lessons had shown that vulnerable static positions were ineffective as missile launching sites but that the mobile mode had been effective. Besides, there were political implications to be considered. NATO countries were already hosts to numerous static installations and the addition of fixed missile launching sites would contribute to the threat of atomic devastation. On the other hand, highly mobile units would be practically impossible to locate and would serve as an able deterrent to an enemy strike 44 . Be that as it might, the Army development team remained responsive to Air Force requirements. _____________________________
44. Draft, JUP Brochure forwarded to Chf, R&D, DA, c. Jan 57, Hist Off files.
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HISTORY - Page 33

Air Force-Army Employment Concept Differences The Army recognized that a large degree of the planned mobility for the system would be lost, for the Air Force method was, by and large, to operate from fixed installations. In this respect, the Air Force planned to gain an initial operational capability (IOC) with the IRBM's against enemy airfields and thereby enhance the penetration ability of manned bombers to win the airpower battle. As the battle progressed, the IRBM's would be launched against secondary targets within range, accuracy, and warhead yield limitations. In other words, the missiles would serve as adjuncts to Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases, and the launching sites would be satellited around these installations. As might be suspected, swift reaction within a 15-minute period was a must because these static-type launching sites would certainly be located by enemy reconnaissance. This meant that servicing, orientation, and checkout of the missile prior to launching would have to be accomplished rapidly. The element of success depended on hitting the enemy sites first. To the Army, this thinking was a calculated risk. World War II V-l and V-2 lessons had shown that vulnerable static positions were ineffective as missile launching sites but that the mobile mode had been effective. Besides, there were political implications to be considered. NATO countries were already hosts to numerous static installations and the addition of fixed missile launching sites would contribute to the threat of atomic devastation. On the other hand, highly mobile units would be practically impossible to locate and would serve as an able deterrent to an enemy strike 44 . Be that as it might, the Army development team remained responsive to Air Force requirements. _____________________________
44. Draft, JUP Brochure forwarded to Chf, R&D, DA, c. Jan 57, Hist Off files.
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